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FROM HIERARCHY TO INEQUALITY;  
FROM A SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS BASED ON CASTE TO ONE ON CLASS 
(some notes for discussion) 
Caste identities have not withered away and in some respects they have even gained in 
strength. In his introductory paper to our Simla workshop, Jim Manor has rightly pointed out 
that caste has come to denote difference rather than hierarchy. A shift has come about in a 
social structure which was based on verticality to one of horizontality. Caste in the 
hierarchical setting was inclusive to the extent that the social ranks from top to bottom defined 
their roles and lived up to their ascribed status in ritualized interaction with each other, a 
system of exchange framed in the jajman-kamin relationship. 
 
In reflecting on the fading away of the caste system in its hierarchical avatar it would be 
relevant also to summarily discuss when and how the principle of verticality came about. The 
setting of the caste order was an agrarian mode of production which evolved over thousands 
of years on the South Asian subcontinent. The peasant society which emerged was a frontier 
society incorporating tribal communities into the caste fold and into the early state formations 
which triggered the inclusion of tribal categories into sedentary agriculture. It was not a one-
way type of development from tribe to caste. Periods of expansion alternated with periods of 
contraction and, supposedly, moving away from becoming entrapped in the caste ranking of 
the time. Thus fluidity and ambiguity have been major features of the change process in the 
political economy resulting in a caste order which started to loose its hybrid and syncretic 
character only under late-colonial rule. The village and the wider vicinity around it became, as 
G. Shah has argued in his contribution, the main context in which the network of caste 
relationships operated. When interaction was not any longer locally bounded and agriculture 
became organized along capitalist lines of production, the hierarchical features backing up the 
caste order increasingly became increasingly inoperative. The drift from verticality to 
horizontality began already in the late nineteenth century and continued throughout the 
twentieth century. It meant that the ideas of natural domination and inferiority were never 
internalized in the worldview of the subordinated categories.    
 
The caste order grew in rigidity at the top and bottom but it did not become less opaque than 
before in the broad intermediate zones. However, the idea of pollution remained fixed for the 
castes at the bottom of the heap. It did not loose its hold in the occupational restructuring 
which marked the transition form a traditional to a modern economy in which criteria of 
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ascription gradually made way for those of achievement. While superiority is not any longer 
acknowledged and inferiority has not become internalized but is now openly contested, the 
social system has graduated from one based on hierarchy to one structured on inequality. Both 
caste and class have remained organizing principles of social ranking as they were also in the 
past but in the new political and economic regime the latter principle has grown into 
overriding importance. In his Presidential Address delivered at the annual conference of the 
Indian Association of Labour Economics, held in Lucknow in 2010, K.P. Kannan has brought 
out the significance of the caste-class nexus in the production and reproduction of social 
inequality. The class dimension was, of course, not missing in the caste order of the past, but 
in the transformation to the capitalist mode of production economic status, concretized in 
terms of power and property, has gained in prominence while ritual status has receded in the 
attribution of positions within the system of social stratification. 
 
The  rigidity of the late-colonial caste order, made legitimate by colonial state makers, was 
gradually replaced by a more open type of class regime distinguished by a higher degree of 
upward and downward mobility in the intermediate zones between the polar ends of the social 
order. It would be difficult to overstate the role of political democracy in changing the caste 
balance after Independence. In the course of my fieldwork in Gujarat conducted from the 
early 1960s onwards I had to listen time and again to the complaints of the big landowners, 
members of the dominant castes. They never got tired of telling me how the founding fathers 
of the nation had erred in granting the right to vote to the landless underclass which had 
remained without voice and agency until then. Initially it seemed that growing assertion and 
pressure from below would not take long to materialize. This was the short episode of state-
directed policies, made manifest in the built-up of a large public sector and with the 
government as mediator between the interests of labour and capital. That model of 
development was already abandoned a few decades later never having delivered what it 
promised. Consequently, the very substantial segments of the population deprived of power 
and property, have by and large remained stuck at the bottom of the economy and society. 
The changing system of ranking – from high versus low to more versus less - has resulted in 
an increase of social distance, an extension in scale of operation and a lengthening of the 
chain of inequality. Polarization rather than growing equality is the driving force in what has 
emerged as a predatory regime of capitalism flourishing under a free market doctrine. The 
bottom classes are dependent for their livelihood on the sale of their labour power on terms of 
employment distinctive for the informal economy, i.e. low and piecerated wages close to 
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survival level, not regular but casual jobs, unskilled rather than skilled work, no social 
provisions or protection and absence of representation. A widening class divide and sustained 
poverty bordering over into acute pauperism are the outcome of this economic regime. 
 
Social consciousness is slow in awakening. The space for collective action is lacking and the 
footloose nature of the workforce, kept in a state of circulation, prevents the mobilization of 
working class solidarity. The compulsion to maneuvering around a labour market, in which 
supply is in excess of demand, explains why primordial loyalties, ties of caste in particular, 
have to be articulated in order to qualify for a job or find access to shelter. As the National 
Commission on Enterprises in the Unorganized Economy (NCEUS) has concluded in its 
series of reports, economic policies are biased in favour of making capital more productive 
and more profitable, while neglecting or even victimizing the interests of the labouring poor. 
The politics and policies followed are those of exclusion, not amended and moderated by a 
lurking suspicion that the excluded masses might rise in revolt and upset the established order. 
The fear of the dangerous class which in the West became a major motive in the drive 
towards inclusion at the end of the nineteenth century is simply not a concern of the 
contemporary Indian elite. That disregard may have to do with the assumption of the natural 
inferiority per se of the working poor but it could also be caused by the informalized.character 
of the economy which puts a premium not only on cheap labour but also on the infinite 
fragmentation and segmentation of the workforce.   
 
The emancipation of labour rights in the West from the late-nineteenth century onwards 
which led to the inclusion of the poor classes into mainstream society, as described and 
analysed by De Swaan, was the outcome of ‘the great transformation’ which restructured 
agrarian-rural societies and economies into industrial-urban ones (Polanyi 1944). For many 
decades now and also in the current era of globalization the dominant development paradigm 
has been that the un/underdeveloped economies and societies would follow in the footsteps of 
the nations which completed in an earlier round the great transformation. However, that 
transition does not seem to be the trajectory in which the late-comers, the majority of 
mankind, is involved. What were agrarian economies have become post-agrarian economies, 
not industrial ones. And what were rural societies, in which the majority of the population 
stayed village inhabitants, are indeed in the process of becoming urban ones but quite slowly 
and reluctantly so. No doubt, the exodus from the countryside is in full swing and in today’s 
India an army of close to one hundred million men, women and children have become 
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footloose for shorter or longer spells of time. However, many of them do not migrate but 
circulate, i.e. they leave from where they come without succeeding in settling down to where 
they go. Sooner or later most of them have to return to their place of departure. The rural poor 
are admitted to the urban domain to work, if and only as long as their presence is required, but 
not to live and settle down as citizens. According to A. Kundu urbanization has decelerated 
from the early 1960s onwards. In a recent commentary he has labelled the trend to keep the 
poor out of the metropolitan growth poles as a form of ‘exclusionary urbanization’ (Kundu, 
EPW, vol.XLVI/20, 14 May 2011: 10-12). 
 
The development trajectory on which De Swaan built his notion of social consciousness was 
marked by a fundamental change from exclusion to inclusion. Although the politicians and 
policymakers in India insist that they have not abandoned this mission, their notion of 
inclusion is that it will come later rather than sooner in accordance with the trickle down 
concept which says that economic growth has to remain prioritized as long as it takes, i.e. 
until there is ‘enough’ surplus accumulated, to also afford a share to the poor. The welfare 
state which came about in the West had another scenario as also told by Tony Judt in a 
retrospective narrative (2010) Ill fares the land ….. (note: where wealth accumulates and men 
decay). Actually, a welfare state for the world at large is scorned at by the powers that be who 
are strict disciples of a free market and insist on the code of neoliberalism. But also in the 
West the welfare state has not become the end product it promised to be in terms of the 
political, economic and social order. The ideology of equality which was the driving force has 
also waned in the part of the world where it emerged. What we are subjected to in the setting 
of Europe is a progressive trend towards inequality. Politics and policies of exclusion are 
specifically targeting the ethnic minorities and that drive is backed up by a major segment of 
mainstream society. Rather than the West following the Rest, the dynamics are the other way 
round. It is in that wider perspective of globalization that we also have to understand the 
tenacity with which the caste system as a social order founded on inequality is kept intact. 
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